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International investing and trade has one unintended consequence; namely, the creation 
of currency risk which causes the local currency value of the foreign receivables or 
investments to fluctuate dramatically because of pure currency movements. The 
academic literature on currencies has typically misunderstood currency risk and 
suggested that currencies have no long term return, are difficult to predict, and difficult to 
take advantage of as the markets are extremely liquid. Hence, typical recommendations 
include either that companies and investors should remove this uncompensated volatility 
by naively hedging back into the base currency or leaving the risk unhedged (which is 
often misinterpreted and, as a result, left unmanaged). The effective financial 
management of such cash flows or investments provides a completely different 
perspective as naïve hedging (unhedging) of currency risk implies a strong view that the 
base currency will appreciate (depreciate) against the foreign currency. Moreover, the 
currency market has many non-profit participants and while exact currency levels cannot 
be predicted, the future direction of currencies can be anticipated through relatively 
simple models and non-profit participants can be exploited. We demonstrate how 
Japanese corporations and investors can develop a much more robust and SMART 
(Systematic Management of Assets Using a Rules Based Technique) approach to manage 
currency risk, thereby adding value from currency fluctuations while managing currency 
risk. In short, they can easily improve performance, risk management and governance. 
Such transactions are easy to implement with currency forwards and while the current 
paper focuses on USD exposures, a more general multi-currency approach can be 
developed for a more comprehensive analysis. 
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SECTION 1: BACKGROUND ON HOW CURRENCY RISK IS CREATED BY 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT OR TRADE 
 
Currency risk is the bane of foreign investment and trade, as trading 
products or assets in foreign countries automatically creates exposure 
to foreign currencies, which left unmanaged can hurt returns. For 
example, consider a Japanese company which exports a product to or 
has a foreign subsidiary in the United States. When the product is sold 
in the United States, in US dollars, those revenues or profits need to 
be sent back to Japan and hence undergo a currency transformation. If 
the payment is instantaneous, then the company can conduct a spot 
currency transaction. However, if the payment is to be received after a 
delay, then there is uncertainty as to the future spot rate and hence 
uncertainty as to the Japanese yen amount that is to be received in 
the future. We can show this in a simplistic way in equation (1). A rise 
in the value of the US dollar between the time of sale and actual 
remitance will lead to a windfall gain in yen terms, whereas a decline 
in the value of the dollar will cause a loss in yen terms. 
 
Cash flow in yen = Cash flow in US dollars + Appreciation/Depreciation of US 
dollars versus yen between time of sale and actual remitance                   (1) 
 
In a similar vein, when a Japanese investor buys assets abroad say in 
the United States, the first transaction is to convert Japanese yen into 
US dollars, and these dollars are then used to purchase stocks, bonds 
or real estate. As the value of the investment changes over time in US 
dollar terms, the mark-to-market Japanese yen value of the 
investment is also being affected by the dollar-yen exchange rate. In a 
simplistic way, the returns on a foreign investment can be expressed 
as in equation (2) and again, an appreciation of the US dollar leads to 
an additional return in yen terms, while a depreciation of the US dollar 
leads to a loss. 
 
Returns in Japanese yen = Returns in US dollars + Appreciation/Depreciation 
of US dollars versus yen                               (2) 
 
Currency risk is the fluctuation of the yen (or base currency) value of 
the cash flow or investment and typically an appreciation of the US 
dollar (foreign currency) is a good risk, while a decline is considered a 
bad risk. Currency risk is effectively the translation risk of foreign 
investment or trade activity and can lead to large swings in 
performance. Most corporations and investors would be foolish to not 
accept the good risk, but would be negligent to not eliminate the bad risk. Since investors and corporations have had difficulty identifying 
whether good or bad risk is likely to result in the future, the tendency 
has been to try to eliminate this risk entirely , because it is believed 
that over the long term, currency risk is uncompensated and that 
hedging was not costly (Perold and Schulman ___). 
 
I f  w e  c o n s i d e r  a  l o n g  t e r m  c h a r t  of the number of yen it takes to 
purchase 1 US dollar, Chart 1 tells a unique story of the yen 
appreciating in value to 1/3 its original value. One dollar purchased 
360 yen in 1971; by November 2006, that value was closer to 117. In 
other words, the US dollar has been in a secular decline against the 
yen and has lost 2/3s of its value – hence a Japanese investor would 
be inclined to believe that US dollar receipts or investments must be 
hedged. We provide some summary statistics on the exchange rate 
from 1971 to 2006 and the mean value is 181 with a standard 
deviation of 74. 
 
Chart 1: Yen per USD, January 1971 – October 2006 
 
Source: Data: EcoWin/Reuters; AlphaEngine® 





180.46  358.4  81.16  277.2  74.3  141.81  301.11  0.60  -1.02 
 
     
 
However, if one should examine the data from the perspective of the 
last 15 years, a slightly different picture emerges. Chart 2 plots the same exchange rate from January 1990 – November 2006, but now 
the story is a very different one. Not only is the range much smaller, 
but the standard deviation is lower and the mean value is very 
different suggesting that as of November, the exchange rate is at its 
long term (approximately) 15 year mean. The fact that when one looks 
at a 15 year chart and sees an oscillation of the value of the currency 
around a mean level of 117 has led many to conclude that currencies 
have no long term return and hence only add volatility to international 
trade and investment. 
 
Chart 2: Yen per USD, January 1990 – October 2006 
   
Source: Data: EcoWin/Reuters; AlphaEngine® 






117.19  159.76  81.16  78.6  13.43  116.6  108.37  0.4337  0.4095 
 









 SECTION 2: BASIC CONCLUSIONS FROM THE ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
 
The case for why currencies should have no long term return is more 
sophisticated than just looking at a 15 year chart and concluding that 
it oscillates around some mean value. The most basic premise of 
finance is that the value of a security or an asset is equal to the 
discounted present value of all future cash flows (at the appropriate 
rate). While an exchange rate qualifies as a security because it is 
traded daily, it generates no cash flow like a bond, offers no dividend 
like an equity and has no “terminal value” as in any typical asset. 
Currencies have been termed a “medium of exchange” and hence 
while traded like a security, they are not an asset in the true sense of 
the word. Hence, one should not expect exchange rates to have a 
return as they are just the “grease” to exchange products across 
different geographical borders. However, because there are various 
forces that affect the demand and supply of currencies, currency 
values change daily thereby generating a return (positive or negative) 
even though theoretically they should not. Hence, if currencies are in 
excess demand relative to a given rate because of an influx of foreign 
investors, the currency will appreciate, but through changes in 
international trade and investment, the assets in the foreign country 
will be overvalued leading to either a reduction in demand or an 
increase in the quantity supplied leading to a subsequent depreciation. 
 
There is an extensive literature on currencies and why they overshoot 
their equilibrium values (e.g., see Dornbusch 1976; Yotopoulos, Pan A. 
and Yasuyuki Sawada (2005). More importantly, according to the Bank 
for International Settlements, this is one of the most liquid markets in 
the world with over Yen 200 trillion traded daily, which is greater than 
the sum of all equity market trades globally (http://www.bis.org/). In 
addition, many researchers have tried to predict future currency levels 
using various structural and time series models and have come to the 
conclusion that currencies are extremely hard to forecast and that 
these models perform no better than a random walk model (Meese 
and Rogoff 1983). Yet coincidentally, Richard Meese went on to head 
currency research at a major asset management company and 
developed successful models to manage currency risk. The Meese-
Rogoff result has been subsequently contested in more recent research 
(Guo and Savickas 2005). 
 
How has the academic community responded in terms of advice to 
investors? “In 1988, Andre Perold and Evan Schulman
2 advocated a 
fully hedged position on the basis of foreign currency risk not offering 
a commensurate return. In what they deem a "free lunch", they argue that as a result of its zero long-term expected return, currency risk 
can be removed without the portfolio suffering any reduction in long-
term return”
2. Therefore, many analysts incorrectly came to the 
conclusion that the availability of extreme liquidity (and hence low bid-
ask spreads), a long term zero return and an apparent lack of 
predictive power of academic currency models meant that investors 
and corporations should naively remove currency risk by implementing 
passive hedges back into the base currency as one could reduce 
voltility without paying for it. Another academic took exactly the 
opposite approach and suggested that investors do nothing and leave 
investments unhedged and unmanaged. “In his 1993 paper, Harvard 
University's Kenneth Froot
3 argues that over long investment horizons, 
real exchange rates revert back to their means according to the theory 
of Purchasing Power Parity and investors should maintain an unhedged 
foreign currency position. He also concludes that, even over shorter 
horizons, the small transaction costs and counterparty risks associated 
with maintaining a currency hedge add up over time and cause the 
optimal hedge ratio to decline as the investment timeframe increases. 
However, Froot does acknowledge that real exchange rates may 
deviate from their theoretical fair value over shorter horizons and 
currency hedging in this context is beneficial in dampening volatility.”
3 
Coincidentally, Ken Froot also was a partner in a firm that offered 
currency management products! 
 
                                                 
2http://www.ssga.com/library/esps/anthonygolowenkohowmuchtohedgeinvolatileworld20030314/page.html. 
See Perold and Shulman (1988). 
3http://www.ssga.com/library/esps/anthonygolowenkohowmuchtohedgeinvolatileworld20030314/page.html. 
See Froot (1993). SECTION 3: THE MECHANICS OF HEDGING 
 
How can an investor/corporations implement an unhedged or fully 
hedged position? For an investor or a corporation to be unhedged is 
very simple – do absolutely nothing, but exchange the future cash flow 
or convert the foreign asset value at the then prevailing spot rate. The 
method through which currency risk is eliminated or “fully hedged” 
from a future US dollar cash flow or a current US dollar investment for 
a Japanese base currency corporation or investor is as follows: enter 
into a simple forward contract to lock in a future dollar-yen exchange 
rate of the entire proceeds or asset value. In other words, a simple 
derivative contract is entered into that formalizes an agreement that 
the investor agrees to buy yen (sell dollars) in the forward market at a 
pre-agreed rate, for a pre-agreed foreign notional value and for a pre-
agreed date. If priced appropriately, no monies are exchanged at the 
initiation at the forward contract and hence forward contracts do not 
require any upfront funding. 
 
What determines this “appropriate” forward price? There is a very 
simple formula that is derived from covered interest rate parity that 
states that the no-arbitrage price of the forward contract or the 
forward price is determined by the spot rate today and the interest 
rate differential between the two currencies for the relevant maturity. 
A simple example explains the calculation of this rate. If the spot rate 
today for yen required to purchase a dollar (which we will refer to as 
Yen/USD even though market convention calls this USD-yen rate) = 
100 and US interest rates for 1 year maturity is 5% and Japanese 
interest rates for 1 year maturity is 1%, then the 1 year forward rate 
would be a stronger Japanese yen by approximately 4%. 
 
Forward Rate t, t+1 = Spott *(1+ Japan Returnt+1)/( 1+ US Returnt+1) 
       = 100*(1.01)/(1.05) = 96.19 
 
Why is this price the no-arbitrage price and no other? To ensure that 
individuals are indifferent between holding their money in dollars or 
yen, the anticipated appreciation of the yen must equal the interest 
rate differential otherwise it will be profitable for investors to move 
assets to the country that offers the better payoff. For example, if the 
anticipated appreciation of the yen is less than 4%, then investors 
would borrow dollars causing the yen-dollar exchange rate to adjust 
until equilibrium is reached at the time of entering into the forward 
contract. Therefore, hedging of the dollar cash flows or investments 
involves selling dollars and buying yen in the forward market. However, 
as one can see from the example above, such a transaction involves selling the currency with the higher interest rate and buying the 
currency with the lower interest rate (or what is refered to in the 
market as “negative carry”). In other words, when yen interest rates 
are lower than dollar rates, the forward rate that is locked in, implies 
an appreciation of the yen to compensate for the negative interest rate 
carry.  
 
Clearly, as the contract approaches maturity and the spot rate moves 
(or interest rates change), the forward contract will either lead to cash 
losses or gains that have to be settled at maturity. Hence, some cash 
is required to settle losses and cash is earned if there are gains. 
 
SECTION 4: THE CORRECT FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE 
 
The financial management perspective is a little more sophisticated 
than the academic perspective. In reality, the realized yen-dollar spot 
rate one year from today will, with 99% certainty, be different from 
the forward rate of 96.19 because of movements in currency markets. 
If the rate is below 96.19 (i.e., the yen is stronger than was predicted 
in the forward market), the investor or corporation will make a loss on 
the spot valuation of the asset or cash flow, but make a gain on the 
forward contract and hence the rate they locked in provides a hedge. 
The same would apply if the rate rose above 100, wherein there is a 
gain on the spot value, but a loss in the forward contract and hence a 
hedge against the currency movement. The attached chart 
demonstrates the profit and loss implications from forward contracts 















One aspect that the academic literature has not examined is that 
implementing a passive hedge implies a view on exchange rate 
movements. If one implements a hedge, then one implicitly believes 
USD/JPY
SPOT  =  100   
Forward loses money
  SPOT  =  96 ARD  =   96    No profit FORW
Forward makes money SPOT  <  96
TODAY  1 YR 
FROM TODAY
SPOT  >  96that the yen will be strong. If they do not believe this, then the correct 
transaction would be to not hedge. Very often, corporations and 
investors believe that if they do not hedge or if they hedge they do not 
have a view on the markets. Quite the opposite is true. The act of 
doing nothing or implementing a passive hedge is actually expressing 
a strong view on the future direction of the currency, and if the explicit 
view of the manager or portfolio manager is different from the implied 
view, such actions must be corrected. Some have deemed such 
implicit market/currency bets being extracted from financial 
transactions as showing the investors their “Implied Views” (see 
Muralidhar and Pasquariello 2001; Black and Litterman 1991). 
 
More important, there is a vast academic (Fama 1984, Engel 1996, 
Sarno 2005) and practical literature (Baz, Breedon, Peress and Naik 
1999) on how forward rates are bad predictors of future spot rates, 
but more important are biased predictors. What this literature implies 
is that historically, rather than the yen appreciating as suggested by 
the forward rate, the yen actually has a very high probability of 
depreciating leading to losses for the hedger. In our chart above, 
instead of the yen moving along the grey line, it has a tendency to 
move along the red line. This result has been found to hold in a 
multitude of currencies and has led to suggestions of a profitable yet 
simple active currency management that focuses largely on being long 
a basket of high yield currencies against a basket of low interest rate 
currencies (Strange 1998, James 2004, Baz et al 1999). Major 
investment banks such as JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, ABN AMRO, 
Citigroup etc., regularly report the performance of their own 
customized “carry” portfolio (Deutsche Bank 2002). What that also 
implies is that an investor or a corporation enters into such a 
transaction, they are implicitly taking a very limited and low probability 
bet that the hedge transaction will be profitable. Such behavior would 
clearly not be considered effective financial or portfolio management. 
The academic literature has many complex explanations for why this is 
the case using terms such as “incomplete information process” 
(Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2005) or “rational 
expectations…generalized equilibrium….stochastic market volatility and 
risk averse utility” (Bansal and Shaliastovich 2006), but the 
explanation for this is much simpler as shown in Muralidhar (2001).  
 
In short, in a market with many traders, portfolio managers and asset 
managers acting as agents of pension funds and banks (or principals), 
entering into a negative carry trade implies immediate losses (as one 
is borrowing more expensively than one is lending) and this gap must 
be made up exchange rate movements. Therefore, it takes very high conviction on the part of the agent to enter such trades, but very low 
conviction to do the opposite and hence the market has an enormous 
incentive to enter positive carry trades (sell yen and buy dollars) 
thereby causing the yen to depreciate. However, when the market’s 
appetite for risk changes and such agency traders, who are working on 
behalf of principals who own the capital, become risk averse, these 
traders have to buy back yen (or the low interest rate currency) to 
cover their borrowing and the yen appreciates. Such a simple example 
is borne out by the evidence during the collapse of Long Term Capital 
and other hedge funds, whereby purchases of Russian bonds had been 
financed through borrowing in yen (or yen sales leading to a weak 
yen) and when Russia defaulted, investors were scrambling to buy yen, 
causing the yen to appreciate dramatically in the matter of a few days. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that all the banks mentioned earlier who 
publicize their version of the carry trade also condition their positions 
(long or short; big position or small position) based on their estimate 
of the market’s risk appetite. They condition the recommended trade 
on variables including swap spreads, credit spreads, and volatility 
indicators such as implied currency or equity volality.
4
 
Another well documented anomaly in the currency market is the 
conclusion that currencies exhibit positive autocorrelation (Liu and He 
1991; Levich and Rizzo 1998). What positive serial correlation implies 
is that currency markets will trend and therefore simple trend based 
strategies can be profitable (Strange 1998, Levich and Thomas 1993, 
Reinert 2000). Therefore, there are positive returns to be gained with 
a clearer understanding of the trending nature of currency markets. 
 
Equally important, if one believes that the currency market is a zero-
sum game, then all losses are equal to some one else’s gain. Again, 
there is a lot of evidence that many of the transactors in the currency 
markets are often making decisions to remove volatility and not 
necessarily to make profit. This is not to suggest that transactors are 
foolish, but rather their motives are focused on volatility reduction only. 
For example, the average corporate treasurer is glad to remove the 
volatility of earnings by hedging currency risk as income statement 
volatility may be penalized by the stock market. One of the interesting 
facts that is observed in examining currency data is that options have 
tended to be over-priced. In other words, the implied volatilities used 
to price options are consistently higher than realized volatilities. This 
may reflect the fact that there is excess demand for options as 
                                                 
4 See JP Morgan (1999). evidenced by the fact that selling short dated currency options can be 
a profitable strategy (Muralidhar and Neelakandan 2002). 
 
In other cases, transactions are made out of necessity. For example, 
pension funds hire international stock portfolio managers and measure 
them relative to an unhedged currency benchmark such as the MSCI 
Kokusai Index or the Russell 3000 Index. Assume that the equity 
portfolio manager believes that the US dollar will depreciate and this 
will allow General Motors to export more cars to Japan. This portfolio 
manager will convert their yen into US dollars (sell yen and buy 
dollars) to purchase General Motors stock. While the stock trade may 
be effective, the currency transaction needed to enter the trade is 
entirely opposite to the currency view of the manager. This is a very 
common occurrence and many international equity and bond portfolio 
managers do not implement active currency strategies, but only 
conduct equity or bond transactions. This has led to the creation of an 
entire industry of “currency overlay managers.” 
 
Third, central banks can intervene in currency markets to improve the 
domestic macro economic environment. For example, if the yen is very 
strong, it can affect employment in Japan or if it is very weak, it can 
lead to inflationary pressures. Central banks will often intervene in 
currency markets to move exchange rates, not to make profits, but to 
alter the economic path. There are numerous examples of the Bank of 
Japan intervening in the currency market to attempt to depreciate the 
yen by buying US dollars. However, academic research has shown that 
these transactions, by themselves have not been profitable and that 
central banks often are more effective at altering the course of the 
exchange rate through coordinated announcements (recall the 
reference for this). 
 
With so many suggestions of imperfections in currency markets 
ranging from a market filled with non-profit participants, presence of 
auto-correlation, forward premium-discount bias and overpriced 
options, effective financial management of assets will definitely benefit 
from intelligent hedging as opposed to naïve full or no hedging. 
Intelligent hedging requires that the investor or corporation conduct an 
analysis to determine whether there is a strong or weak possibility that 
the foreign currency will depreciate or appreciate. If the indication is in 
favor of an appreciation, then being less than fully hedged will lead to 
gains in the spot market conversion, and lower losses (or no losses) on 
the forward contract leading to much better financial results. If the 
indication is in favor of a depreciation of the foreign currency, then 
being hedged is preferable to being unhedged and will lead to gains in the forward contracts. However, establishing whether a currency is 
likely to depreciate or appreciate or more appropriately how much to 
hedge is the focus of the next section. 
 
SECTION 5: MANAGING CURRENCY RISK WITH SIMPLE MODELS 
   
Since the earlier analysis has suggested that there are many 
anomalies in the currency market, this section examines whether 
investors or corporations can exploit these anomalies by using a 
systematic, dynamic approach to hedging. We develop a SMART 
approach or Systematic Management of Assets using a Rules based 
Technique (SMART). The advantage of a SMART approach is that it 
ensures consistency, transparency, reduction of emotion and the 
possibility to evaluate whether such approaches can truly outperform a 
naïve constant hedge based on skill and not just luck.   
 
Benchmarks: The practical research method developed here is as 
follows: we built some simple rules as described below and we 
compare these rules based on two possible benchmarks. Currency 
managers tend to ignore the risk of the underlying spot position (as 
that is incorporated in the performance of the foreign equity and bond 
manager) and hence compare the performance of the SMART dynamic 
hedge to a passive benchmark. We will test this same set of models 
that set the weight between unhedged and fully hedged against three 
simple benchmarks: (a) unhedged; (b) 50% hedged and (c) fully 
hedged. We will call this the “Asset Management Perspective.” 
 
However, corporations may want to examine the performance of the 
combination of the spot currency risk plus the dynamic SMART hedge 
to a benchmark that also incorporates the spot exposure. Hence we 
again compare this mix of positions to the same three benchmarks 
listed above, but where the spot risk is incorporated into each of the 
benchmarks. We call this the “Corporate Management Perspective.” 
We do this to show why many corporations prefer to be fully hedged 
(as it has the lowest volatility), whereas in many asset management 
arrangements the benchmark is unhedged (as it requires no 
transactions and hence appears to have no risk). 
 
SMART Rules and Strategies: We will develop certain models that 
have been discussed in the practical literature and attempt to improve 
performance and risk for the currency manager and corporate 
treasurer using a simple approach. We will create four simple rules 
based on each indicator and these Rules will only trigger once a month 
at month end and hold the position for the entire montb. The Rule for each indicator will have a simple binary recommendation to whether to 
be fully hedged or unhedged. For example, in the extreme version of 
the “carry” trade, if US interest rates are higher than Japanese interest 
rates, then the hedge ratio is set at 0% or unhedged as the 
assumption is that the interest rate differential is likely to lead to an 
appreciation of the dollar (and vice versa). We will weight each of the 
Rules equally (at 25%) into what we will call a Strategy. Hence, the 
Strategy recommendation is the equally weighted aggregate of each of 
the Rules and will be as follows: if two rules are recommending a fully 
hedged position and two are unhedged, then the net recommendation 
of the Strategy will be 50% hedged (25%*100% +2*25%*0%). The 
only difference between the fully hedged, 50% hedged and unhedged 
Strategy will be the starting position on day 1 as we will assume that 
the investor or corporation is at the benchmark position. After the first 
day, the recommended allocation will be the same for all three 
Strategies that are measured relative to the three benchmarks, but 
the deviation from benchmark will depend on the benchmark allocation. 
For example, if the SMART Strategy recommends a 50% hedge, then it 
is long yen relative to the unhedged benchmark (of 0%), neutral to 
the 50% and short relative to the fully hedged (or 100%) benchmark. 
 
A quick comment on benchmarks: when the benchmark is unhedged, 
the dynamic SMART approach can only add hedges; when the 
benchmark is fully hedged, the dynamic SMART approach can only 
“lift” or reduce hedges. Both of these are one-sided benchmarks (i.e., 
the dynamic action is to only unhedge/hedge as opposed to unhedge 
and hedge) and hence there will be periods when such strategies will 
not perform well. This would be the case when the yen is appreciating 
and in a fully hedged benchmark the best strategy would be to not 
deviate from the benchmark. In a more symmetric approach where the 
benchmark is 50% hedged and either increasing the hedge to 100% or 
reducing a hedge to 0%, a stronger yen would allow for additional 
purchases of yen.  
 
For simplicity, we will develop Rules that capture the anomalies 
indicated above. The three most common approaches to developing 
smart currency models fall under the categories of Trend - exploiting 
the positive serial correlation; Carry - exploiting the tendency for low 
interest rate currencies to depreciate or in a different approach, 
favoring the currency where the long rates are rising rapidly; and Yield 
Curve – favor the currency with the highest momentum of 10-year 
rates (as indicating currencies that will attract capital because of rising yields).
5 In addition Gao and Savickas (2005) indicate that the default 
premium and what they term idiosyncratic stock market volatility are 
useful predictors of currency. We will focus simply on the default 
premium. 
 
In short, we will develop Rules that (a) favor the trending currency 
defined as the currency where the moving average over a short term 
window is greater than the moving average over a longer term 
window; (b) favor the currency with the higher short term interest 
rate; (c) favor the currency with the highest momentum of 10 year 
yields; and (d) favor yen when the US default premium is high relative 
to its mean and favor the dollar otherwise. These are very simple 
Rules and indicates that there can be much greater value and risk 
management from more complex Rules, but the intent of the paper is 
to show that even such simple Rules provide valuable performance and 
risk management and implu outperformance relative to the three 
benchmarks based on skill.  
 
Objective: Our goal would be to ideally improve the performance of 
the dynamic SMART hedge relative to the passive static benchmark, 
but ideally also improve risk. We will define risk across various 
measures such as either lowering the volatility, worst single monthly 
performance, the ratio of good risk to bad risk
6 or even drawdown 
compared to a passive hedge. This is a bit more extensive than the 
simple approach of lowering volatility as some of these measures 
capture the risk of non-normal distributions but also includes measures 
more appropriate to principal-agent delegated transactions (which one 
can easily argue applies to investors and corporations). 
 
In addition, using the measure developed in Muralidhar (2004) called 
“Confidence in Skill”, we will examine how confident one can be that 
the performance generated by the SMART hedge is better than the 
naïve benchmark approach. In other words, this technique compares 
the excess return generated by any one rule or a combination of rules 
and normalizes for the difference in volatility between the active 
approach and the benchmark, the correlation between the two and the 
length of history. Other simpler measures used in the industry include 
the ‘Success Ratio” or the number of non-negative months relative to 
                                                 
5 Another approach exploits the tendency for currencies to be influenced away from the 
mean value because of differing inflation expectations. One of the simplest ways to 
capture this example is to make rules based on the slope of the Yield Curve and to 
favor currencies with the flattest slope (Acar and Middleton 2004) 
6 This measure captures the semi-deviation of positive events divided by the semi-deviation of negative 
events and gives an indication of the skew of the results. Ratios greater than 1 are good. total months or what is called the “Hit Rate” in baseball. We ignore 
transactions costs as the amount of turnover is very low and currency 
trading typically in USD/JPY has a transaction cost of 1.5 pips. 
Therefore, unless turnover were meaningful, this should not affect the 
final result. 
 
Data: Data utilized for this analysis is as follows: Spot data and 1-
month LIBOR/TIBOR data was available from January 1990 – October 
2006 from EcoWin Reuters. We use the spot and interest rate data to 
create a series of one-day forward contracts to calculate performance 
of the forward contracts. In addition, data on the 10-year yields are 
used as is the difference between Baa US bond yields and long term 
yields (to create the Default Premium). 
 
Method and Time Window: We test these rules over the entire 
period and do not partition it for in-sample or out-of-sample testing as 
we have not optimized the formulae of either the Rules or weights of 
the Strategy. However, one could argue that Trend based rules can be 
based on data snooping as setting the long term and short term 
averaging period can be biased be total period performance. Since the 
attempt here is not to develop the Optimal policy, but rather to show 
that simple ideas beat a passive benchmark, we use a single period 
back test. In future research, we will create more optimized version of 
these Rules and partition data into sub-periods. The reason that no 
optimization is carried out is that we assume that Rules based on 
simple and different factors will tend to not be highly correlated and 
hence a simple equal weighting is adequate. 
 
This data window covers appreciations of the yen (to its strongest 
point in 1995) and depreciations (dramatic in 1998 prior to the 
collapse of Long Term Capital) and hence is meant to represent 
reasonable currency cycles. However, as the spot rate chart 2 shows, 
the first period is marked by two pronounced appreciation and 
depreciation cycles, whereas the second period is marked by less 
volatility and more cycles. As a result, one should expect less 
pronounced performance in the second period as typically greater 
trending results in greater performance opportunities. This is where 
one could argue that optimized rules set based on first period data will 
fail to perform over the second period.  
 
 
Results – Asset Management Perspective: Over this period, the 
spot rate from a yen perspective has declined by 1.13% annualized 
with a volatility of approximately 11% annualized (line 1 in Table 1), whereas a portfolio of forwards to hedge the USD exposure would 
have generated -0.44% annualized return for 11.14% volatility (line 2 
in Table 1). A 50% hedge of USD exposures would have generated a 
lower negative return and volatility at -0.07% annualized and 5.59% 
annualized, respectively (line 3 in Table 1). Needless to say, in the 
asset management perspective, an unhedged benchmark would have 
no return and volatility. One interesting result from the table is that 
the success ratio of the 100% hedge back into JPY had non-negative 
performance only 45% of the months over this window giving some 
hint as to why the “carry” trade is so popular and possibly leading to 
the conclusion that uncovered interest rate parity does not hold. 
However, the spot rate has a success ratio of 50% over the same 
period. The worst single month ranges from -14.5% for the spot rate 
to -10% from examining just the hedging contracts to be fully hedged 
and the worst drawdown can be quite large at -42% for fully hedged. 
 
The table compares the performance of the three dynamic SMART 
strategies in isolation and then against their respective benchmarks. 
As shown in lines 4, 6 and 8, the performance of the three strategies 
in absolute terms in nearly the same as we use the same Rules 
weighted equally and the only difference is attributed to different 
starting points for each. In the case of full hedging, the dynamic 
SMART strategy (line 4) generated an annualized 1.22% for 4.76% 
annualized risk, indicating a dramatic value added of 1.66% 
annualized return (line 5) relative to a naïve monthly full hedge of USD 
exposures. In addition, the absolute annualized risk of the SMART 
hedge (4.76%) is substantially less than that of the naïve hedge 
(11.14%). Further, the drawdown is substantially lower on an absolute 
basis and the ratio of good risk to bad risk is higher.  On a relative 
basis (line 5), 55% of the months have non-negative value-added and 

































1 SPOT RATE UNHEDGED -1.13 10.94 -0.10 -14.5 0.81 -47.13 50.5 N/A
2
PORTFOLIO OF FORWADS 
FOR 100% HEDGING -0.44 11.14 -0.04 -10.03 1.47 -42.2 45.54 N/A
3
PORTFOLIO OF FORWADS 




PORTFOLIO OF ACTIVE 
FORWARDS FOR FULL HEDGE 1.22 4.76 0.26 -4.2 1.52 -12.11
5 RELATIVE TO BENCHMARK (2) 1.66 7.5 0.22 -9.39 0.86 -16.01 54.95 88.17
50% HEDGING
6
PORTFOLIO OF ACTIVE 
FORWARDS FOR 50% HEDGE 1.3 4.72 0.28 -4.2 1.56 -12.11
7 RELATIVE TO BENCHMARK (3) 1.37 2.92 0.47 -4.63 1.05 -6.15 56.44 97.66
UNHEDGED
8
PORTFOLIO OF ACTIVE 
FORWARDS VS UNHEDGED 1.38 4.69 0.29 -4.2 1.08 -12.11
9
RELATIVE TO BENCHMARK 
(NONE) 1.38 4.69 0.29 -4.2 1.08 -12.11 57.43 86.66
 
 
Table 1 – The Asset Management Perspective: Comparing Smart Management to 
Static Benchmarks 
 
In the case of 50% hedging, the dynamic SMART strategy (line 6) 
generated an annualized 1.3% for 4.72% annualized risk, indicating a 
dramatic value added of 1.37% annualized return (line 7) relative to a 
naïve monthly 50% hedge of USD exposures. In addition, the absolute 
annualized risk of the SMART hedge (4.72%) is slightly lower than that 
of the naïve hedge (5.59%). In addition, the drawdown is substantially 
lower on an absolute basis (-23.55% vs -12.11%) and the ratio of 
good risk to bad risk is higher.  On a relative basis (line 7), the ratio of 
excess return to risk is a very high 0.47 because of the symmetry of 
the benchmark. 56% of the months have non-negative value-added 
and one can be 97.6% confident that this outperformance is skill-
based and not noise. 
 
In the case of the unhedged benchmark, the dynamic SMART strategy 
(line 8) generated an annualized 1.38% for 4.68% annualized risk, 
indicating a value added of 13.8.% annualized return (line 9) relative 
to a naïve unhedge position. This is the case as the benchmark in this 
case implies doing nothing and hence the volatility of the dynamic 
SMART strategy is higher than the benchmark volatility. The drawdown as a result is higher.  On a relative basis (line 9), 57% of the months 
have non-negative value-added and one can be 86% confident that 
this outperformance is skill-based and not noise. 
 
As shown in the above analysis, from an asset management 
perspective, the fully hedged benchmark is the most volatile and 
hence there is the greatest opportunity for reducing risk. However, the 
most symmetric benchmark, 50% hedged offers the best relative 
performance per unit of risk and also the highest confidence in skill. 
 














































































































































































Source: AlphaEngine® - www.mcubeit.com 
 
For completeness, in Chart 3, we show the dynamic allocation 
recommendations of the SMART approach relative to a 50% hedged 
benchmark (or any benchmark) over this window. We also show the 
cumulative growth of the excess returns on the RHS axis. Since 
interest rates in Japan have always been below US rates over this time 
period, the carry model is always short yen and long USD. Therefore, 
the Strategy has a maximum hedge of 75%. However, Chart 3 
demonstrates when constantly being hedged or unhedged would be 
sub-optimal. We also show the annualized excess and relative risk of 




Chart 4 – Calendar Year Excess Return and Risk over a 50% Hedged Benchmark 
 
Source: AlphaEngine® - www.mcubeit.com 
 
Results – Corporate Management Perspective: The corporate 
management perspective integrates the spot risk with the currency 
hedging transactions and hence will give a different perspective. Since 
the spot rate and the forward hedge are highly negatively correlated, 
the risk profile of the benchmark changes dramatically. 
 
Over this period, the spot rate from a yen perspective has declined by 
1.13% annualized with a volatility of approximately 11% annualized 
(line 1 in Table 2), whereas a portfolio of forwards to hedge the USD 
exposure would have generated -0.44% annualized return for 11.14% 
volatility (line 2 in Table 2). However, as shown on line 3, since the 
two are negatively correlated, the combined profile has a negative 
return of -0.33% annualized, but a volatility of 1.04%. This is one 
reason why corporate Treasurers are glad to hedge currency risk as it 
can eliminate volatility of performance, even though the performance 
is negative. 
 
                                                 
7 For Japanese corporations and pension funds, the fiscal year perspective may be more relevant, but will 
show the same profile of a fairly consistent outperformance. From a corporate management perspective, the unhedged benchmark 
is the most volatile and hence offers the best potential for risk 
reduction (comparing the annualized risk of line 1 to line 11) and adds 
meaningful value of 1.78% annualized. The fully hedged benchmark 
has the lowest risk of 1.04% and while dynamic SMART management 
could add 0.77% annualized, this may not appeal to a Treasurer who 
is purely volatility focused. However, what the result shows is tht an 
intelligent Treasurer should realize that naïve hedging is giving up the 
potential to add value in a market with many non-profit participants 
and such value-added can add yen to the company bottom line with 
minimal effort. 
 
The 50% hedged benchmark has lower volatility than the dynamic 
approach, but a return that is lower by more than 1%. The worst 
drawdown of the dynamic SMART strategy is better than the unhedged 




Table 2 – The Corporate Management Perspective: Comparing 






















1 SPOT RATE UNHEDGED -1.13 10.94 -0.10 -14.5 0.81 -47.13 50.5 N/A
2
PORTFOLIO OF FORWADS 
FOR 100% HEDGING -0.44 11.14 -0.04 -10.03 1.47 -42.2 45.54 N/A
3
SPOT + FULL HEDGED              
= (1) + (2) -0.33 1.04 -0.32 -2.1 0.63 -21.62 56.3 N/A
4
PORTFOLIO OF FORWADS 
FOR 50% HEDGING -0.07 5.59 -0.01 -5.11 1.47 -23.55 45.54 N/A
5
SPOT + 50% HEDGED                




PORTFOLIO OF ACTIVE 
FORWARDS FOR FULL HEDGE 1.22 4.76 0.26 -4.2 1.52 -12.11
7 SPOT + ACTIVE = (1) + (6) 0.47 7.47 0.06 -8.48 N/A -31.13
50% HEDGING
8
PORTFOLIO OF ACTIVE 
FORWARDS FOR 50% HEDGE 1.3 4.72 0.28 -4.2 1.56 -12.11
9 SPOT + ACTIVE = (1) + (8) 0.57 7.5 0.08 -8.48 N/A -31.13
UNHEDGED
10
PORTFOLIO OF ACTIVE 
FORWARDS VS UNHEDGED 1.38 4.69 0.29 -4.2 1.08 -12.11
11 SPOT + ACTIVE = (1) + (10) 0.65 7.53 0.09 -8.48 N/A -31.13
 
  
SECTION 6: EXTENSIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
The purpose of this paper was to establish that investors and 
corporate treasurers are taking implicit bets when they select simple 
static currency hedging policies. By developing 4 simple Rules and 
combining them equally, the goal was to show that (a) the naïve 
benchmark could be outperformed with, ideally, risk reduction; and (b) 
by combining different rules on different factors, that the performance 
of the Strategy would diversify the risk of the dynamic SMART hedging 
program. In Table 3, we demonstrate the performance of the 
Unhedged Strategy (USD UNH SIM) and the Rules that compose the 
Strategy. First, every Rule (CAR = Carry; Def Prem = Default 
Premium; Mom = comparison of a short Moving Average vs a long 
Moving Average of USD/JPY; and Yld Mom = Yield Momentum) has 
positive performance. We can see that the strategy has an annualized 
return-to-risk ratio of 0.29, which is higher than any of the Rules that 
make up the strategy as is the case with the Ratio of Good Risk to Bad 
Risk. Similarly the Confidence in Skill is higher as well, and the Worst 
Single Negative Month of the Strategy is better than that of any Rule 
that makes up the Strategy. Finally, the Annual Turnover is just 100% 
or less than 10% every month and hence with costs of 1.5 pips (1/100 
of a basis point), one can see that the value added would be preserved 
even after costs. 
 









Source: AlphaEngine® - www.mcubeit.com 
 
The attached correlation table examines the static correlation of the 
excess returns of the various Rules in the Strategy over the 1990-
2006 period. It demonstrates that each of the Rules is not highly 
correlated with the other Rules leading to the benefit of diversification 
across such factors. The correlation table is intentionally static for 
simplicity. One could calculate rolling correlations and use that as an 
input to dynamically weighting the Rules in the Strategy to further 
improve performance and risk management. 
  














Equally important, this is a single currency experiment and adding 
more currencies to a portfolio of exposures should ideally add more 
diversification dimensions and potentially improve the performance-to-
risk profile. In addition, the Rules were made very simple in that they 
made recommendations just once a month, at month-end, and held 
for the entire month, but a more dynamic process given the low 
transactions costs, could update the dynamic SMART hedge more 
frequently than once a month to improve risk management. 
 
The challenge however in managing cash flows is that the size of the 
flows can vary from month to month and we have assumed a constant 
exposure and that the rolls of transactions took place only at month 
end. In this approach, if a loss is sustained on a large cash flow and a 
series of gains experienced on a small cash flow, the net yen impact 
on the profit and loss can be negative. Further, in managing foreign 
investment exposures the future value to be hedged is uncertain as is 
the date of the receipt (as it depends on the return of the foreign asset 
in local currency) so there is the potential that if one sets the notional 
value of the hedge to the currency exposure, and this is the market 
convention, that at maturity of the contracts, the dynamic or static 
hedge may be in excess of the exposure, though this is a relatively 
small problem as with such small costs one can constantly manage the 
hedge size if they wanted to. 
 
 
SECTION 7 – CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this simple paper, we wanted to demonstrate that many Japanese 
investors and corporations are often taking an unintended risk when they conduct business or invest abroad – namely, currency risk. This 
risk if unmanaged can impact performance and risks and hence many 
investors have applied naïve static hedging policies. The academic 
literature on currency management has identified many anomalies in 
the currency market but still have proposed relatively naïve hedging 
policies. We demonstrate through a simple example with USD 
exposures that capturing these anomalies through simple Rules that 
change the recommended hedge dynamically based on easily observed 
current market factors can lead to better performance and risk 
management than a naïve static hedge. More important, combining 
some simple Rules in a very simple way to create a dynamic SMART 
strategy can lead to diversification of performance of the combination, 
in turn leading to better performance per unit of risk, where risk can 
be defined in many different ways (worst single month, worst 
drawdown, ratio of good risk to bad risk). We used the exact same 
Strategy for various benchmark choices (unhedged, 50% hedged and 
fully hedged) and showed that from an asset management perspective, 
the fully hedged option had the highest volatility and potential for 
volatility reduction, whereas the 50% hedged mandate gave the most 
symmetric opportunity set and best relative return per unit of risk. The 
corporate management perspective finds that by adding back the risk 
of the spot exchange rate that the fully hedged benchmark has the 
lowest volatility and that the unhedged perspective which is what most 
accounting measures would support is the most volatile. In short, 
regardless of benchmark and composition of currency exposures, 
effective financial management of foreign transactions requires clients 
to develop such dynamic SMART approaches as the currency market 
has unique inefficiencies. Not exploiting such anomalies and engaging 
in naïve static hedging is effectively lending one’s balance sheet for 
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